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THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES - A
COMPARISON OF SOME COMMON-LAW
AND CIVIL LAW JURISDICTIONS
MAX A. POCK
R OMAN jurists of the classical period viewed ownership as
an absolute power of control and disposition over objects.
This power was concentrated either in a single person, which
was the usual case, or in several persons who exercised it
contemporaneously. Legal theory in the many modern deri-
vates of the Roman law-embraced in that somewhat loose
term civil law--has adopted that concept wholeheartedly,
and, as a consequence, has placed a similar emphasis upon the
doctrine of absolute, undivided, and concentrated ownership.
Free and untrammeled alienability is, of course, the key
feature of such absolute power, and the concept of terminable
and successive ownership developed by the common law seems
entirely incompatible with it. To the person trained in the
common law, who is accustomed to dividing his property in
two ways-in terms of quantity and in terms of time--such
simplicity of approach may seem indeed remarkable because
it dispenses entirely with the technical and often so trouble-
some future interest.
Yet, this simplicity is only too deceptive.' Practical
necessity induced the Roman legal system as well as its
modern derivates to recognize the element of time as a second
dimension in their law of property, and to admit that sev-
t Legislative Research Analyst, University of Michigan Law School.
Formerly Instructor in Law, University of Michigan Law School.
1 This unitary and absolute concept is generally recognized as a juristic
fiction which, however, still permeates much of the legal thinking of civil
lawyers who treat ownership, and the many public and private law restrictions
with which the exercise of ownership is fraught, as separate concepts which,
therefore, do not interfere with one another. See EHRLicH, SOZIOLOGM DES
RIcHTs 81 (1913).
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eral persons may not only share ownership concurrently, but
may also have successive property interests in an object. The
perfect symmetry of the civil law as a system of well organ-
ized, consistent, abstract legal norms reveals itself, at least
in this context, as an illusion which is maintained by sub-
suming the rules pertaining to successive ownership, to per-
petuities, and to restraints upon alienation under a topic
where the common-law lawyer least expects to find them-
under the law of decedents' estates. Thus the civilian in
some small way is guilty of the same sin of which he accuses
his common-law colleague so readily: putting rules of law
into airtight little compartments and pretending that, once
safely tucked away, they cease to interact upon one another.
It is a fact that the Roman lawyer was able, without
much ingenuity, to create perpetuities that would have de-
lighted the resourceful English conveyancer in times past.
The civil lawyer was able to follow his mentor's footsteps,
and it was only recently that his ability to create perpetuities
was curtailed.
HISTORICAL OUTMINID OF THD ROMAN LAW
AGAINST PERPF-PEUITIES
There is little indication that the Roman law either be-
fore or after what we refer to as the classical period attached
as much significance to the abstract doctrine of concentrated
ownership as did the jurists of the classical period and of the
period following the reception of the Roman law into the
Continental legal systems. In fact, some of the institutions
of the republic bear a striking resemblance to our freehold
tenures. The tenancy at will (precaria rogans), the per-
petual tenancy (emphyteuta),2 and the tenancy of municipal
lands (ager vectigalis),3 created most peculiar relationships
that are quite incompatible with the classical concept of un-
divided ownership. The tenant held from the true owner,
but he was much more than a mere lessee. The remedies of
2 BucYLANn, ROMAx LAW 223 (2d ed. 1932).
3 Id. at 275.
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the owner and of the tenant differed only in form and little
in effectiveness. The owner recovered his land and protected
it in a real action; the tenant, by praetorian edict. But the
effect was similar. It seems, in fact, that the whole notion
of concentrated ownership as an absolute power of disposition
may have been the result of a rather artificial abstraction:
the person entitled to the real action was designated as the
absolute owner as though the person entitled to the praetorian
edict did not exist. Thus the strived-for simplicity was
achieved at least in form.4
As was to be expected, the need to establish successive
property interests in particular objects made itself felt at a
very early date. Soon it was common practice for testators
to devise their estates to an heir (heres) with instructions
(fideicommissum) to pass it on to a third person either upon
the heir's death or upon the happening of some other event.
The formal law of succession took little notice of this practice
of the "living law" until one L. Corbelius Lentulus, proconsul
in Africa, put Augustus "on the spot" by charging him with
several fideicomrmissa. The Princeps was not in a position to
breach the trust and ordered that the fideicomrmnssa be car-
ried out.5 This was a powerful precedent. Soon afterwards
Augustus found himself compelled to establish an extraordi-
nary writ (extraordinaria cognitio) in favor of the fideicom-
mnssum. He appointed the highest magistrates whom he had
inherited from the republic-the consuls and later the praetor
-to hear actiones em fideicommisso, as these remedies were
called.6
Thus the "trustee" (fiduciarius) could now be compelled
to carry out the "trust." In classical law the fideicommissum
created several successive owners with absolute powers of
alienation, who were merely bound not to exercise these
4 BvcKLAxD & McNAiR, ROMAN LAW AND CommoN LAW 82 (2d ed.
1952).
5SCHuLZ, PRINCIPLES OF ROMAN LAW 182 (1956); MUIRHEAD, ROMAN
LAW 173 (1937).
S SCHULZ, ROMAN LEGAL SCIENCE 111 (1946); SOHM, INSTITUTES § 115,
at 597 (2d ed. 1901) ; JOLOWICZ, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF
ROMAN LAW 406 (1952).
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powers.7 In contrast to the cumbersome ritualism of the
Roman will and the Roman legacy, the fideicomrmissum was,
at least in the early period, completely devoid of formal re-
quirements. It could be created in writing or by parol-there
was no need for witnesses and no interdict against the use
of a foreign language."
Perhaps one of the principal reasons for the introduction
of the fideicomm isson, or fideicommissary substitution, as it
is now called, was the desire to appoint beneficiaries who
could not take as heirs under the formal law of succession.
Typical examples for such a case were the foreign wife of a
Roman citizen, or the children resulting from marriages with
foreigners.9 But the reason for the survival and widespread
use of the fideicommissary substitution after the restrictions
of the formal law had been removed, was the inherent pos-
sibility to create future interests in favor of unascertained
persons (invcertae persozae). This was a marked advantage
over the formal law of succession which allowed only the ap-
pointment of persons in being or at least in utero at the date
of the death of the testator.'0 Fideicommissary substitutions
became the perfect device for family settlements. A great
number of perpetuities were created. The famous will of
Damasius (108 A.D.), reconstructed from fragments of an in-
scription on marble, may serve as an example: that fine
family-conscious Roman gentleman devised his estate to a
fiduciariwus with a direction that it remain with his descend-
ants perennially and in perpetuity." Emperor Hadrian
found it necessary to decree that substitutions could no longer
be made in favor of personae incertae. Justinian removed
that prohibition again, probably with a view to encourage the
creation of perpetuities in favor of the Church. But when it
became evident that the national wealth was not always
channeled ultimately into charitable undertakings, Justinian,
7 BUCKLAND & McNAIR, op. cit. supra note 4, at 82.
8 SonIM, INSTITUTES § 115, at 597 (2d ed. 1901); JoLowicz, op. cit. supra
note 6, at 423.
9 LE, ELEMENTS OF RoMAN LAW 236 (3d ed. 1952).10 Sonu. INSTITUTES § 117, at 602 (2d ed. 1901).
"LEE, ELEMENTS OF ROMAN LAW 240 (3d ed. 1952).
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in his Novel 159 (555 A.D.), decreed that substitutions must
not be made beyond the fourth generation. As we shall see,
that Four Generations Rule has become the law of South
Africa and other parts of the world that are within the orbit
of the Roman Dutch law, and has been received into the other
derivates of the Roman law with some modifications and
restrictions. 12
FIDEICOMMISSARY SUBSTITUTIONS TNDER
THE CORPUS IURIS
In order to facilitate an understanding of the various
changes to which fideicommissary substitutions have been
submitted by modern civil law systems, it is necessary to
outline in simple terms the legal relationships created by
the fideicommissumr during the reign of Justinian. It was
at that time that the institution had reached the last stage
in its maturing process before passing, in one form or another,
into the Roman law derivates. A historical tracing of each
step of its development can therefore be dispensed with.
A simple transaction will suffice as an example of the
legal effect of a substitution under the Corpus Iuris:
T to A, absolute ownership for A's life, then upon A's
death to B absolute ownership for 10 years, then to B's oldest
son (. The following rules apply:
1. A, B, and C need not be heirs, they need only be
legatees; it follows that either the whole estate or only a
quota thereof, or even single objects, could be made subject
to substitutions.'3
2. Property vests in the beneficiary co instanti upon
the happening of the event upon which his interest is con-
ditioned (death, lapse of time)."4
3. A may not alienate the property. If he disposes of
it he may only grant a defeasible title. B, after the condition
12 LEE, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMIAN DUTCH LAW 384 (5th ed. 1953).
13 BUCKLAND, A MANUAL OF ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 210-22 (1925).
14 BUCKLAND, ROMIAN LAw 359 (2d ed. 1932).
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of his entitlement has occurred, has a right in rem even as
against bona fide purchasers from A."8
4. The limitation to B is conditioned upon his surviving
A. If he fails to survive A, then A becomes the full owner
of the property. C cannot take it because B, the person bur-
dened with the fideiconrnissim, is nonexistent. However,
the testator may provide that in case B cannot take, X should
take by direct substitution for B. Such explicit clause in the
will would preserve C's interest, i.e., it would prevent the
collapse of the whole pyramid of fideicommissary substitu-
tions upon one link, one person, failing to become entitled to
take.16
As we shall see, the Roman substitution was not at all
like the trust, despite its superficial resemblance to that com-
mon-law institution. It was rather like the old grant to uses.
One might say, in common-law parlance, that the fiduciarius
was the owner in fee, subject to an executory limitation over
to another.'7
THE EUROPEAN FAMILY SETTLEMENT-A PECULIAR
BLENDING OP SUBSTITUTIONS AND FEUDAL NOTIONS
Before the era of the great codifications in the 19th cen-
tury, and even much later in some countries, a good deal of
land was tied up in continental Europe by family settle-
ments.'8 Nevertheless, the family settlement did not play
as important a part in France, Germany, or Austria as
it did in England. The reason for this difference is found,
partially at least, in the existence of some peculiar legal
institutions which produced a social atmosphere that was not
at all favorable to the entail; a quick excursus into this
otherwise irrelevant field is perhaps warranted here. France
and Germany, to pick only two of the many countries ad-
hering to similar policies, have always tended to favor the
testator's family when balancing the conflicting interests of
15 Id. at 363.16LEE, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROAIMAN DUTCH LAW 382 (5th ed. 1953).
17 Id. at 380.
is Amros & WALTON, INTRODUCTION TO FRENCH LAW § 102, at 332 (1935).
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the testator and of his family in the disposition and control
over the estate. A French testator finds his property divided
into a part over which he may freely dispose (la quotitM
disponible) and a part which is more or less reserved for cer-
tain relatives (/a r6serve h6r6ditaire). His disposable share
may easily shrink to one-fourth of the estate in case he has
more than two legitimate or adopted children. An added
peculiarity of this institution is that its restriction extends.
in some measure, to the testator's power to make gifts
inter vivos.19
The German compulsory distributive share (Pflichtteil) 12 0
is based on a similar policy. It restricts the power of dis-
position in favor of certain agnates, descendants, and in con-
trast to the French r6serve, even in favor of the spouse. This
may, with the exception of provisions for the spouse, shock
the American lawyer because it nullifies or at least dimin-
ishes the power of free testamentary disposition. The Eng-
lish lawyer is perhaps less shocked, since he has lived, for
almost two decades now already, with the English Family
Provisions Act,2 1 which empowers courts, in their discretion.
to allow a certain class of "dependents" surviving the tes-
tator to share in the net estate under certain circumstances.
The family settlement was based on the Roman fideicoz-
missunin quod familiae relinquitur, a species of the ordinary
fideicommissary substitution which bound all takers to leave
the estate to a designated member of the testator's family.
Continental lawyers blended it with feudal notions so that
family settlements could only be established by a limited
number of aristocratic families, and special laws limited to
particular families were in vogue (Halus-Gesetze) .22 Trans-
actions under these special laws were roughly like this:
Blackacre was settled upon a member of the family and
19 Id. at 339, § 105.20 DEUTscHEs BUERGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [hereinafter cited as B.G.B.]
§§ 2303-52.
21 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2, c. 64, § 152 (1952), amnending 1 & 2 Geo. 6
(1938).
22 GIERKF, 1 GRUNDZUEGE DES DEUTSCHEN PRIVATRECTITES IN HOI.TZFNDORFF-
KOHLERS ENZYKLOPAEDIE § 72 (7th ed.).
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made subject to some form of entailed succession, primogeii-
ture being preferred as a general rule.23
The land was thereby made indivisible, inalienable,
exempt from executions and hypothecation.2 4  In great por-
tions of Europe, land was therefore virtually unobtainable.
It is not surprising, then, that the family settlement had come
to symbolize the economic power of the aristocracy and that,
as a consequence thereof, it was forced to yield to the iron
broom of the French revolution. Napoleon's Code Civile pro-
hibited all forms of substitutions (with minor exceptions as
we shall see) in order to make absolutely certain that the old
aristocratic settlement would not stage a return disguised as
an innocuous fideicommissary substitution.25 Other codifica-
tions were equally based on this policy of -suppression of the
economic power of the landed aristocracy-the later ones
were also founded upon the ideas of economic liberalism
which saw in free alienability of land the only assurance that
it would find its way into the hands of the fittest. However,
the German Civil Code of 1896 (effective 1900), which fell
into this latter category, did not want to compromise the feel-
ings of the ruling families and left it up to -the separate
sovereignties to retain or to abolish the family settlements
(Famnilienfideilkommisse) .26
The Weimar constitution of 1919 finally tackled the prob-
lem by ordering the dissolution of all family settlements,
and when actual dissolution was delayed it was, ironically
enough, the Hitler regime which gave a belated coup de grace
to the institution which had been swept away by the great
slogans of the French revolution a hundred and fifty years
before. 2s Family settlements were also abolished in Switzer-
23ENB=Rus-KIPP-WoLP, 5 LHRBTmicr DEs BUERGERLiCHmE RECETES
436 (1955).
2 4 WoLrF, GRuDRiAS DES OESTERREICHISCHEmi BUERGERLICHEN RECHTES 303
(1923).
25 CoDe CiVIL c.c. 896.2 6ETNFUEHRUNGSGESETZ Zub! BUERGLCHE" GESETZBUCH art. 59,[1896]
RECHSGESErZBLATr 604.
27 WEmI&ARM VASSUNG art. 155, abs. 2, satz. 2.
28 Reichsgesetz vom 6.7. [1938] 1 REICHSGESETZSLATT 825.
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land,29 but a "grandfather clause" saved many individual
settlements from extinction.
ANALYSIS OF THE POLICY AND THD FUNCTIONS OF THE RULE
AGAINST PERPETUITIES
English reforms of the law of property, culminating in
the Law of Property Act of 1925, have succeeded in resolv-
ing in some measure the old conflict between two socially
justifiable desires:
1. The desire of the owner of property to endow desig-
nated successive members of his family or a charity, thus
determining the fate of his estate and bringing about some
degree of inalienability of the property which it includes.
2. The social desirability of keeping land (as well as
other objects of property) freely marketable. According to
the Law of Property Act it is now possible to fix the descent
of property within the limits of the rule against perpetuities,
and at the same time to assure relatively free alienability.
This is done by providing that property may be preserved in
value, but not in specie."0
The rule against perpetuities was designed, so it is often
maintained, to prevent the creation of certain contingent in-
terests, and not to prevent the inalienability which may at-
tach to property that is affected with such contingent in-
terests. The very term "rule against perpetuities" has fallen
into disfavor and has yielded to the more clumsy designation
"rule against the remoteness of vesting" because it was felt
that the latter expressed more accurately the functional na-
ture of the rule. Various persuasive examples are adduced
as evidence for the nonconcern of the rule with the question
of alienability; prominent among them is the gift to charity
and then over to another charity upon a condition precedent
which may happen after the period of the rule has expired.
Since such gifts, although they may take property out of
29 SCHWEIZERISCHS ZIVILGESETZBUCH [hereinafter cited as Z.G.B.] § 448 (2).
30 LAWSON, REAL PROPERTY 140 (1958).
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circulation for a very long time, are not inimical to the
rule, the only explanation for their permissibility must be
that the rule is not intended to strike against inalienability
as such.
Whatever the original purpose, English property law re-
forms have clearly demonstrated that the rule has a dual
effect, if not a dual purpose. This bifurcation can be seen
by observing the effects of the rule upon two totally different
ends that may be accomplished through the creation of con-
tingent interests: 1. A testator may wish to fix the fate of
an estate by determining that designated persons, e.g., his
great-grandchildren, are to get a specific interest in it. His
main concern may not be that they get Blackacre, but that
they get something of value which represents the economic
significance of Blackacre. 2. A testator may want Blackacre
to remain in the family at all costs; in other words, he may
want to determine not only that his property is to descend
upon certain beneficiaries, but that it is to descend in specie.
The rule against perpetuities strikes out against both alter-
natives, although they are conceptually different.
In order to compare or to contrast the common law and
the civil law system it is therefore necessary not only to find
a civil law institution which takes the place of the rule
against perpetuities but to analyze it in terms of the two-
pronged effect of the rule at common law by posing two
questions: 1. To what extent does the rule permit or pro-
hibit testators to designate ultimate recipients of interests
in their estate? 2. To what extent does it permit or pro-
hibit restraints upon alienation?
THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES AS LIMITING THE POWER
TO DESIGNATE BENEFICIARIES
Let us summarize briefly the rules pertaining at common
law, with which the reader is fully conversant already. The
rule against perpetuities at common law was expressed in
that famous sentence by John Ohipman Gray, "No interest
is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-
one years after some life in being at the creation of the
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interest." 31 This twenty-one year period is generally ex-
tended by one or two periods of gestation. This is not a modi-
fication of the concept, it is rather an assumption already in-
herent in it that a person in utero is a life in being.3 2 The
rigidity of the period has been relaxed by legislation in Eng-
land: the Law of Property Act provides that the gift can be
saved if twenty-one can be substituted for any other age
specified in the gift.3 3 This means that a testator who, out
of ignorance of the law and from a belief that a person of
twenty-one is not fully capable of handling his own affairs,
has stipulated some other period, e.g., twenty-five years, does
not find that his intentions have been thwarted by the rule.
This solution, to some lawyers, may seem better than the
harsh rule followed by courts in the United States, which
causes such gifts to fail and thereby creates intestate prop-
erty.3 4 The rule is not explicit on the number of measuring
lives that are available to a testator. It seems, however, that
this omission has not caused much trouble except for some
isolated cases. The guide in both England and the United
States seems to be: is the death of every person in the group
reasonably ascertainable in a court? 35
The suggestion has also been made that the rigidity of
the rule should be relaxed in other ways. Absurdities such
as the fertile octogenarian could well be eliminated if the
rule were to receive not a prospective but a retrospective
application. Such "wait and see rule," as it is popularly
called, has in fact been adopted in two states, Pennsylvania 36
and Massachusetts. 7 It is safe to say that it has been ac-
corded little applause, though opinions are divided on its
efficacy. Professor Simes, for example, feels that it creates
31 SIzmxs & SmrrH, FUTUPE INTERESTs § 1222 (2d ed. 1956).
3 2 1d. § 1216.
33 LAWSON, REAL PROPERTY 140 (1958).
34 SimEs & SmITH, op. cit. supra note 31, § 1228.
35 LAWSON, op. cit. supra note 33, at 139; SIMES & SMITH, op. Cit. supra
note 31, § 1223.
36 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.4 (1950).
37 MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 184A, § 1 (1955).
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confusion by tieing up interests which would otherwise be
perfectly alienable.38
The rule does not strike against gifts to charities with
gifts over to other charities upon the occurrence of an event
which lies beyond the twenty-one year period.3 9 This, as we
have seen, furnishes the chief support for the proposition
that the rule is not primarily concerned with alienability.40
After this cursory summation it is now necessary to ex-
amine the civil law rule against perpetuities in more detail.
The Romans moved from an unlimited power to create
future interests to the Four Generation Rule.41 Post-
glossators doctored Justinian's Novel 159 and made it more
liberal by allowing the testator to exclude its operation alto-
gether by insertion of sufficiently definite provisions in his
will to the contrary. They also liberalized the rule by con-
struing it to mean that the count should begin with the first
fideicommissary, and not with the fiduciary; this lengthened
the period by another generation. In this form the rule en-
tered the law of South Africa,42 the law of Malta,43 and
other areas within the influence of the Roman Dutch law.
Although the period during which vesting could be suspended
seems to us unusually long, certain of the hardships which
we might expect to result from property being tied up for
such a long time could be alleviated by a relief procedure,
which can be outlined as follows: 1. all ascertained benefi-
ciaries who are sui juris may extinguish the substitution by
sale or other arrangement; 2. courts are empowered to dis-
charge property from the burden which attaches to it, to
authorize an exchange, or an incumbrance upon special ap-
38 Simes, Is the Rde Against Perpetuities Doomed?, 52 MICH. L. REv.
179 (1953).
39 SimEs & SMITH, FuvuE INTERESTS § 1280 (2d ed. 1956).
40 Since the purpose of this article is the survey in the broadest possible
terms the fundamental features of the common and civil law systems per-
taining to the rule against perpetuities, no mention is made of the statutory
changes that have been undertaken in the various states, be they declaratory
or amendatory of the common-law rule (e.g., "two-donee" statutes, statutes
restricting the suspension of the power of alienation, etc.).
4' LE, EIxmENTS oF ROMAN LAW 241 (3d ed. 1952).
42 LEE. AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN DUTCH LAW 384 (5th ed. 1953).
43 Strickland v. Strickland, [1908] A.C. 551 (Malta).
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plication whenever minors and unborn beneficiaries are in-
volved. However, since this power is qualified by the maxim
that courts shall not change testamentary dispositions, it
is generally exercised only upon the most compelling
reasons.4 4 In this respect it is not unlike the power, be it
statutory,4 5 or at common law,4 6 which is inherent in the
courts of most of the jurisdictions in the United States to
order a judicial sale of property affected with a future in-
terest, and to impress a trust upon the proceeds in favor of
all the beneficiaries.
In Germany, future interests may only be created, as we
have seen, in respect to the estate minus the compulsory
shares in favor of certain members of the family. German
law, unlike the Roman Dutch law, does not limit the num-
ber of substitutions which can be made. But the same re-
sult is achieved by the imposition of a time limit within
which all interests of contingent remaindermen must vest or
fail.4 7  That period is thirty years after the death of the
testator. It is subject to two important exceptions: 1. If
the right of the ultimate beneficiary is conditioned upon some
special event in the lives of the fiduciary or the fideicommis-
sary, who are both in being or at least in utero at the death
of the testator, such event may occur after the thirty year
period has expired. 48 In other words, the period is suspended
whenever measuring lives in being are available. Example:
T to A to B, and then to C upon B's death. If both A and B
are lives in being, the condition of C's entitlement (B's
death) may occur after the expiration of the thirty year
period. 2. If the ultimate beneficiaries are either brothers
or sisters of the fiduciary or the fideicommissary, the condi-
tion of their entitlement may also occur after the thirty year
period. 9 This is an extension of the first exception, because
it provides that the final beneficiary may take from someone
4LE, AN INTRODUCTiON TO ROMAN DUTCH LAW 386 (5th ed. 1953).
45 SIMES & SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS § 1946 (2d ed. 1956).
46 Id. §§ 1941, 1943.
47 B.G.B. § 2109.4 8 Id. § 2109, abs. 1, ziff. 1.4 9 Id. § 2109, abs. 1, ziff. 2.
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who was not a life in being at the date of the testator's death.
Example: T to A to B, then to the sister of B upon B's death-
A must be a life in being, B may be a persona incert. This
means that the ultimate vesting may, under particularly
fortuitous circumstances, be extended to about a hundred
years. There is, as pointed out above, no limitation upon
the number of fideicommissaries that may be appointed
(Nacherbeneinsetzung), but they must all be lives in being;
if they are not, then their interests must vest within the thirty
year period, unless they fall within the two exceptions. 50 If
either the fiduciary or the fideicommissary or both are "juris-
tic persons" (i.e., corporations, foundations, etc.) and the
right of the ultimate beneficiary is conditioned upon some
event in the lives of the fiduciary or the fideicommissary,
such event must take place not more than thirty years after
the death of the testator.51 The rationale is, of course, that
the last event in one's life is one's death, and that the time
of vesting can therefore only be suspended for the life of a
human being. This practical limitation would be meaning-
less with "juristic persons" which enjoy perpetual succession.
Austria limits the number of substitutions that can be
made without limiting the time within which the interests
must vest in the incerta persona. In the case of real property
only one substitution can be made; in the case of personalty
two are permissible.2 Switzerland provides only for a single
substitution in all cases.53 France prohibits all substitutions
except for two narrow exceptions (substitutions permises)54
which allow a single substitution in favor of particular rela-
tives: 1. "A father or mother may give the whole or part
of the property which the law permits to be freely disposed
of, to one or more of their children for life, subject to a
proviso that it shall revert to such child's or children's child
"
0 ExNECCRUS-KiPP-WoLFF, 5 LEHRnUCH Dzs BUERGERLICHEN RECHTES
438, § 114 (1955).
21 B.G.B. § 2109, abs. 2.
62 OE~TRRmICHISCHES ALLGEmEINES BURMGMLICHES GEsETzBuCU therein-
after cited as A.B.G.B.] §§ 611, 612.
53Z.G.B. §448(2).
54 CODE CIVIL c.c. 896.
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or children; but the property cannot be tied up further." 11
2. "When a person dies without leaving any children, then
he may make a gift, either by donation inter vivos or by will,
of the whole or part of the property, of which he has the free
disposal, in favor of one or more of his brothers and sisters,
subject to a proviso that it is to revert to the children born,
or to be born, to such beneficiaries; but the property cannot
be tied up further." ";
There is another exception which belongs to the law of
contracts but deserves to be mentioned here because it en-
ables a grantor, under certain circumstances, to create a di-
rect right of action in an unascertained person against a
grantee of property who has stipulated to turn it over to that
unascertained person upon the happening of a certain event
(stipulatio pour autrui) .5 Although such stipulations may
not always be upheld (the code itself provides no specific
answer), there is at least one reported case of a permissible
perpetuity which could not be created in common-law
countries: A French bishop gave money to a town, for the
endowment of religious education, with the proviso that the
money should go to the donor's successor in the bishopric
if the town should ever decide to adopt secular education.
The court decided in favor of the episcopal successor and not
the bishop's own heirs.5
Italy has adopted the French solution (Sostituzione
Fideicomizissa.ria),G" but a special arrangement was added
for the appointment of charities as fideicommissaries.6
To summarize: the civil law rules against perpetuities
utilize one or more of the following mechanical devices in
order to prevent the creation of certain contingent interests
-a period of time during which the interest must vest, a
limitation upon the number of substitutions that may be cre-
ated, and a restriction on the class of persons in whose favor
a substitution may be limited.
55 CODE Civm cc. 1048.
5' CODE CIVIL CC. 1049.
" CODE CIVIL CC. 1121.
5
8 Amos & WALTON, INTRODUCTIOx TO FRENCH LAW 128 (1935).
59 CorICE CrIVLE c.c. 693.
60 ENTE PUBBLICO CODICE CIVILE art. 11.
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THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES AS LIMIITING RESTRAINTS
UPON ALIENATION
English reform legislation culminating in the Law of
Property Act of 1925 has made land almost freely alienable.
Only two of the common-law estates were retained; all other
estates were turned into equitable interests. A landowner
who wishes to settle land upon his family may still do so,
within the limits of the rule against perpetuities, but he finds
that he has created-noens volens-a trust for the members
of his family whom he wanted to endow with a legal estate."
The legal estate is transformed by operation of law into a
trust fund which may be invested and reinvested. Thus Eng-
land was able to allow a testator to provide for his family
according to his own plan, and at the same time to make land
an almost freely marketable commodity.
The only estates retained were the fee simple and the
term of years absolute. This was only logical, since the fee
simple is the very foundation of property, and the term of
years serves a particular economic purpose which would be
thwarted if it were turned into a trust fund by operation of
law-"a tenant cannot plough a trust fund." 62
In the United States, land affected with a future interest
is inalienable in principle. There is, however, an exception,
which was first recognized in Bofil v. Fisher, 1850,63 estab-
lishing that courts of equity have an inherent power to order
a judicial sale and to establish a trust of the proceeds in favor
of all beneficiaries. But, since the law will not change the
form of a man's property without cogent reasons, this power
has been exercised only sparingly. Some states do not recog-
nize it at all, others have adopted it by statute and, occasion-
ally, have even extended the scope of its applicability.6 4
In England, the problem is the exact opposite of the one
just described. The question there is not whether the land
6 1 LAWSON, REAL PROPERTY 83 (1958).6 2 LAws0N, THE RATIONAL STPENGTH OF ENGLISH LAW 94 (1951).
63 3 Richardson's Equity 1, 55 Am. Dec. 627 (S.C. 1850) ; SIMms & SMITH,
FuTuaa INTRESTS § 1943 (2d ed. 1956).
'4 SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 43 (1955).
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can be sold or improved upon application of the determined
beneficiaries, but whether a trustee who is willing to sell can
be stopped by the beneficiaries from doing so. The trustee
may in fact be prevented from varying the investment by a
court upon special application, but only upon compelling
reasons.
6 5
Since property is no longer taken out of circulation by
the creation of future interests in England, it is appropriate
to ask whether the rule against perpetuities has not been de-
prived of its meaning there. The answer given is no, but the
theories upon which the validity and, consequently, the reten-
tion of the rule are based, though interlacing, are basically
different.
They deserve to be mentioned briefly here: 1. The rule
is a compromise between the desires of the dead and the de-
mands of the living. An owner of property should be al-
lowed to designate the beneficiaries of his estate, but this
power should not be absolute-in other words, this is the
English version of the policy against the dead hand. 2. The
rule makes land more perfectly alienable than it is while it
is affected by a future interest, since the testator, even under
the Law of Property Act, may hamper actual alienation by
stipulating that certain persons have to consent to alienation.
Also, a court may, upon application, delay or even prevent
alienation. This theory merely asserts that alienability has
not yet been fully achieved, and the rule must therefore be
retained. 3. The rule destroys trusts, or acts as a restraint
upon their creation. Whether the property in the trust fund
is alienable or not matters little here. The significant thing
is that the trustee is generally limited in the types of invest-
ments he may make; he cannot invest in risk capital. The
proponents of this view are particularly worried about the
balance between trust and risk capital and its profound in-
fluence upon the growth of an economy. 6
6 5 LAWSON, REAL PROPERTY 115 (1958).
66 Id. at 144. In the United States the availability of risk capital was cer-
tainly the cause for unsurpassed industrial growth. See generally HEILBRONER,
THE WORLDLY PHLOsoPHERs chs. 3, 8, 9 (1953).
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One may not agree with either the English or the Amer-
ican approach to the problem of alienability of land affected
with a future interest, but one must admit that both solu-
tions are certain and relatively predictable. The civil law
systems, on the other hand, present a hopeless muddle. The
codes themselves do not furnish specific answers, and the
status of the property while affected with a future interest
must be ascertained from somewhat conflicting legal writ-
ings. It is here that the ideal concept of absolute ownership
breaks down completely: on the one hand the fiduciary is
proclaimed as an absolute owner, on the other, his power of
alienation is limited by the duty to turn the property over
to the fideicommissary upon the expiration of his ownership.
Germany seems to have the most specific regulation of
the fiduciary's rights and duties in her code. He is not
treated as a mere usufructuary, which was his legal status in
the former Law of Prussia (Preussigehes Landrecht) .67 He
may sell the entire estate, except for interests in land
(Grundtueckrechte), and the proceeds assume the place of
the property sold.68 He cannot make gifts from the estate
without obtaining the consent of the fideicommissary
(Nacherbe).69 While the code limits only those dispositions
which would tend to frustrate the rights of the fideicommis-
sary (Anwartschaftsrechte), there are more practical regu-
lations which prevent the fiduciary from exercising powers
as an owner: the land registry office is compelled of its own
motion to enter upon the land register (Grundbuch) the fact
that the rights of the owner of record are limited by a sub-
stitution.70 In Austria there is but one provision which pur-
ports to define the legal position of the fiduciary: "... the
fiduciary has a limited ownership with the rights and duties
of a usufructuary" 71 which indicates that his rights are more
limited than under German law. Switzerland does not de-
67 ENNECCE.US-4PPoWoLFF, 5 LEHRBUCH DES BUFRGFuLICHE RCHTnS
§114 (1955).
68 B.G.B. § 2111.
69 B.G.B. § 2113(2).
7 B.G.B. §2113(1); GRUNDBUCHSGESTZ § 52.
71 A.B.G.B. § 613.
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fine the powers of a fiduciary in her code; 72 in legal theory
he is often analogized to the usufructuary. 73 The Roman
Dutch law seems to limit the power of alienation like the
Corpus Iuris. This is particularly evident in the rule that
substitutions can be created impliedly by specifying that cer-
tain property should not be sold by the beneficiary.7 4 In
France the fiduciary (grev6 de, substitution) cannot create
real burdens upon the property nor can he alienate it. 75
It may be concluded that the position of civil law sys-
tems on the question of alienability of property affected with
a future interest is no more liberal than the position of Amer-
ican law, and that it is far removed from the concept of free
alienability imparted by the English Law of Property Act.
In spite of the practice to analogize the fiduciary to a usufruc-
tuary, the concept that he is an absolute owner limited in
time suggests that at least in theory he is possessed of a
limited power of alienation until his successor's title
matures.76 Yet this power seems to have no more practical
value than the power of a trustee to dispose of property in
derogation of the trust instrument.
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE USUFRUCTUARY AND THE
FIDUCIARY UNRELATED TO POWERS OF ALIENATION
The principal distinction between the interests of the
usufructuary and of the fiduciary is that the former has no
title which may ever ripen into full ownership. After the
usufruct expires, the reversion is in the donor, or more accu-
rately in the person who established the usufruct. On the
other hand, if the limitation to the fideicommissary fails, the
fiduciary's title becomes absolute; the reversion is not in the
donor, but in the fiduciary's heirs and assigns. 77 This is cer-
72Z.G.B. § 488.
73Tuop, DAS SCHWEIZERISCHE ZIVILGESETZBUCH 335 (1934).
74 LEx, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN DUTCH LAW 376 (5th ed. 1953).
75 AMos & WALTON, INTODUCTION To FRENCH LAW 332 (1935).
76 LE, op. cit. -upra note 74, at 381.
7Id. at 383.
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tainly the rule in the Roman Dutch law and in French law.
7 8
German and Austrian law have similar but more complex
provisions on that point; they draw distinctions between the
various conditions or events upon which the fideicommis-
saries' rights depend. Thus, if the event is certain to happen
(Befristung), such as the death of the fiduciary, the rights
of the fideicommissary will devolve upon his heirs and assigns
despite the fact that he has not survived the event.7 9 But
if the event is not certain to happen, as for example the mar-
riage of the fideicommissary, his passing of an examination,
or selecting a certain profession, and the fideicommissary
in fact fails to bring about its happening, then the fiduciary's
limited ownership ripens into absolute ownership.8 0
There are, of course, many other differences which vary
considerably from country to country proving the hetero-
geneity of the civil law, and incidentally, the inaccuracy of
the term civil law which is so often construed as applying to
a body of legal systems which exhibit great uniformity. In
France, to use but a few of many examples, the fiduciary is
less limited than the usufructuary in regard to waste. 81 In
Germany he enjoys a much wider latitude with regard to
powers of administration and disposition. He is only liable
for that "care which he usually exercises in his own
affairs," 82 while the usufructuary is held to a higher ob-
jective standard of care.
The difference between the trust and the substitution
deserves brief mention here. It is of such fundamental na-
ture that the civilian often wonders why common-law lawyers
describe the latter as "testamentary trusts" or "land trusts";
in the law of trusts the legal and equitable ownership are
divided and are exercised contemporaneously. In the law of
substitutions we find only legal interests which are successive
78 Amos & WALTON, op. cit. supra note 75, at 129.
79B.G.B. §2108(2) (Ger.); A.B.G.B. §615, abs. 2 (Aust.).
SO B.G.B. § 2108(2) in conjunction with § 2074; A.B.G.B. §§ 705, 704, 703.
8 1 Amos & WALTON, op. cit. supra note 75, at 129.
s2B.G.B. § 2131.
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but not contemporaneous-they constitute entirely separate
successive ownerships. The second interest becomes effective
as soon as the first one terminates. It is here that the con-
cept of concentrated, undivided, and absolute ownership of
the Roman law is at its best; it will not allow the parallelism
of legal and beneficial ownership. 83
CONCLUSION
The creation of future interests, perhaps with the excep-
tion of the jurisdictions within the orbit of the Roman Dutch
law, plays only a minor role in civil law countries. This is
attributable in some measure to a deeply engrained social
policy which allots compulsory shares out of the estates of
decedents to members of their families. The existence of
such "obligatory state-imposed estate plans" which, though
not all-embracing, may extend to considerable portions of an
estate, is not conducive to the creation of future interests.
Restrictions upon substitutions-the civil law "rule
against perpetuities"-are generally more severe than their
common-law counterparts; they restrict the number of such
interests that can be created, they narrow the class of per-
sons to whom they may be limited, and they may impose a
period of time beyond which "vesting" may not be suspended.
The fiduciary is conceptually treated differently from an
owner of an estate affected with a future interest at common
law. The civil law treats his interest as full and absolute
ownership and not merely as a limited estate; yet, at the
same time, it maintains that he may only exercise his powers
as owner in such a manner as not to interfere with the future
enjoyment of the fideicommissary-the "owner" of the future
interest. This somewhat contradictive attitude serves to
eliminate the differences between the civil law and the
common-law rule and constitutes another inroad upon the
83 LEa, op. cit. supra note 74, at 374. See generally Bolgar, Why No Trusts
in the Civil Law, 2 Am. J. Comp. L. 204 (1953).
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pure concept of absolute ownership of the Roman law.
Although, as we have seen, future interests and the applica-
tion of the rule against perpetuities are less significant in
civil law than in common-law countries, it is important to
note that both legal systems have, through legal norms dif-
fering in theoretical bases and positive content, arrived at
similar institutions in order to meet similar needs. This may
prove again that, if we define "law" as the social order which
governs man's conduct in society, rather than as positive and
formal legal rules, we find that the "laws" of the civilized
countries exhibit considerable similarities.84
84 See Ehrlich, The Sociology of Law, 36 HARv. L. RIv. 130 (1922).
